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In the late 1920s, in an attempt to break Europe's hold 
on the world rubber industry, Henry Ford looked to South America. 
There, surrounded by the Amazon rain forests, the Ford Motor Company 
built a modern manufacturing center and christened it

Fordlandia

By Mary A. Dempsey

Deep ruts cleaved the road and I bounced high in the passenger seat of the pickup, fingers of sweat running down my back. But I drew a delighted breath when we turned onto a long, cool lane lined with magnificent old mango trees. White wicker chairs rested on the porches of clapboard houses where dark green shutters blocked the baking sun. Tidy lawns exploded with flowers; a handful of pines lent aromatic shade. Fire hydrants stamped by a Michigan manufacturer poked up at intervals from the concrete sidewalks.

The bucolic setting harkened to northern Michigan of the 1930s, but this was Brazil’s Amazon rainforest in the 1990s. I had reached Belterra, the spot once described as “Dearborn in the Jungle.” A former rubber-workers’ town now owned by the Brazilian government, Belterra is the vestige of a battle between Yankee ingenuity and Mother Nature—the remains of Henry Ford’s bid to become a rubber baron.

Gone were the outdoor movie screens that half a century ago brought scratchy Hollywood releases to illiterate jungle workers slashing rubber trees 150 miles south of the equator. No one remembered where the Belterra Club’s library had been; they did identify a rough field as the former nine-hole golf course. Model T Fords from Dearborn once rolled down these streets and, on rare occasions, the hospital dispatched its ambulance, but the only vehicle we passed in the sleepy village was a Volkswagen in a carport.

My guide, Steven Alexander, wheeled his truck behind the Catholic church, where a road led to the once classy homes of the upper-management Brazilians who helped run the plantation during the 1930s. Bigger than the first houses we passed, they boasted expansive yards and few neighbors. We passed the old hotel, now abandoned, its white paint peeling. The houses along the dirt road—once capped in asphalt—grew more secluded as we reached a plateau overlooking the Tapajos River. “This is where the North American managers lived,” said Alexander, a U.S. expatriate, "as we hopped from the truck and stood in the place where the view was best and the breezes coolest."

Henry Ford never visited Brazil, but he looked to the South American country to break a British-Dutch rubber monopoly. Already in the early twentieth century, Harvey Firestone used wild Brazilian rubber for the tires he shipped to the Ford Rouge plant, where they were slapped on Model Ts.  But the Chicago tire maker was displeased with the quality of the wild latex. Asia was, at the time, the world’s rubber capital thanks to plantations started with seeds spirited out of Brazil. In Asia, where rubber trees flourished because they had no natural pests, a cartel kept prices high.

Some say it was the pricing that annoyed Ford; others say it was simply logic—why import rubber from halfway around the globe if it thrived in the Americas? While Ford pondered the idea of a plantation in the Americas, the U.S. government as early as 1923 was surveying Venezuela, Brazil and Central America to evaluate their potential as rubber sources. A government report by Carl LaRue, a University of Michigan botanist, gave high marks to a plot of land in Brazil not far from where the Tapajos River dumps its clear waters into the chocolate current of the Amazon. After reading LaRue’s report, Ford approached Brazilian authorities and found them enthusiastic. They hoped the auto pioneer would spark another rubber boom like the one that fueled their economy in the nineteenth century.

In 1927 Detroit attorneys O.Z. Ida and W. L. Reeves Blakely negotiated an agreement granting the automaker 2.5 million acres deep in the Brazilian Amazon, police protection and duty-free entry of all Ford equipment and supplies. In exchange for the free land, the U.S. firm promised to return nine percent of the operation’s profits to the local and national governments after twelve years. The pact, signed in October, marked the first plantation attempt in Brazil. Previously, only wild rubber was tapped.  

In August 1928 the steamer Lake Ormoc, pulling the barge Lake LaFarge, left Dearborn. Four months later, it unloaded its first cargo on a murky, malarial shore of the Tapajos. Motorboats, a steam shovel, a pile driver, tractors, stump pullers, a locomotive, ice-making machines and crates of food were hauled from the barge and ship, along with prefabricated buildings, the components of a powerhouse taken from the Highland Park plant and a disassembled sawmill. With the equipment, Ford’s new firm, the Companhia Industrial do Brasil, was born. And a hilly riverside spot known until then as Boa Vista—Portuguese for “good view”—was christened Fordlandia.

Fenced in by jungle, Fordlandia was transformed into a modern suburb with rows of snug bungalows fed by power lines running to a diesel generator. The main street was paved and its residents collected well water from spigots in front of their homes—except for the U.S. staff and white-collar Brazilians, who had running water in their homes. The North Americans splashed in their outdoor swimming pool and the Brazilians escaped the sun by sliding into another pool designated for their use. “Villa Brasileira,” as one area of the town was known, boasted tailors, shops, restaurants and shoemakers to serve the local workers. The sweet smell of bread wafted from a bakery; the butcher shop offered beef, pork and chicken at subsidized prices. On paper, it sounded like a dream.

But there were problems. Fordlandia’s uneven terrain eroded—making it costlier and slower to operate tractors—and collected stagnant water, breeding malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Draining swamps and covering standing water with a film of kerosene helped, as did the spraying of DDT but the malaria was a constant nemesis. During the dry season, from July to November, the river at Fordlandia dropped as much as forty feet, leaving the dock too low for boats to approach. Humid temperatures pushing the mercury into the nineties were intolerable for the transplanted Michiganian managers. Ants, moths, mites and leaf disease attacked the trees. “LaRue picked the wrong place,” said Dr. Emerick Szilagyi, a Henry Ford Hospital surgeon who ran the plantation hospitals from 1942 to 1945.

Even with 1.4 million trees planted in symmetrical rows, 340 workers appearing on the regular payroll and students enrolled at three schools, Fordlandia was a flop. But the auto manufacturer would not give up. In 1934, the Companhia Industrial do Brasil swapped part of the concession for 703,750 acres one hundred miles further north along the Tapajos and a second Ford plantation complex, Belterra, was added to the jungle map. Although Fordlandia continued operations with a reduced staff, Ford officials plunged ahead at top speed to set up and equip Belterra—the plantation charged with correcting the blunders of its predecessor.

I traveled two hours of rough roads to reach Belterra from Santarem, the closest Amazon port city. During the 1930s and 1940s boats and a horse trail were the only links to the port. My route passed ramshackle palm huts with dirt floors, patchy fields of black pepper and shoeless children playing by the road. I gasped in surprise when we reached Belterra. Sidewalks lined the streets and power lines hung from poles. Paint peeled from vacant industrial buildings, but the homes were well kept. Screens—the first I’d seen in four days in the Amazon—stretched across windows.

Screens were just one of the Yankee customs transported to Fordlandia and Belterra. Detroit physician L. S. Fallis, Sr., the first doctor sent from Henry Ford Hospital to run the Fordlandia medical center, attempted to eradicate malaria and hookworm among Brazilian seringueiros (rubber gatherers) by distributing quinine and shoes. The quinine was accepted but shoes were an unwelcome novelty. It is an exceptional photo that shows the shirtless seringueiros, machetes in hand, shod only with floppy rubber-soled sandals; their children went shoeless. The jungle dwellers also found Fordlandia’s two-family homes hopelessly hot and ugly and the idea of bathrooms repulsive. Even today, plumbing is a rarity in the jungle.

At the same time, Ford’s 6:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. work schedule was unpopular with plantation employees accustomed to slashing trees several hours before dawn, then resuming the work at sunset for piecemeal pay. But the promise of free housing and food, top-notch health care for the workers and their families, and a salary of thirty-seven cents a day—double the regular wage—kept the seringueiros on the job. In fact, there had never been so many new opportunities for paying jobs in the Amazon, prompting large-scale jungle migration from Brazil’s north and northeastern provinces. But even the job-hungry workers had a breaking point.

“I’m a worker, not a waiter!” a Fordlandia employee reportedly yelled in the food line one day, sparking the plantation’s most notorious riot. Workers armed with machetes joined the protest against the self-serve mid-western cuisine in a country where food traditionally was served at the table. The seringueiros demolished the cafeteria as North American officials scrambled to the dock, jumped into boats and waited in the middle of the river for Brazilian troops to quell the melee.

Violence erupted again over workers brought from Barbados. The seringueiros complained the islanders not only took their jobs, but were paid higher wages. One payday uprising started with the injury of three West Indies workers and ended with Ford’s agreement to ban Barbadians from the concession. Brazilians in Santarem told me many of the West Indians never made it back to the Caribbean; their descendants still live in cities along the Amazon. 

Generally, the company-imposed routine met hit-and-miss compliance. Children wore uniforms to school and workers responded favorably to suggestions they grow their own vegetables. But most ignored Ford’s no liquor rule and, on paydays, boats filled with potent cachaca—the local sugar-can brew—pulled up at the dock. Poetry readings, weekend dances and English sing-alongs were among the disputed cultural activities.

“Even today, there are people who still know some of the traditional American songs,” said Alexander, who has spent extensive time interviewing local residents to trace Fordlandia and Belterra’s history. Yankee customs caught the attention of writer Charles Morrow Wilson when he visited Fordlandia and Belterra in 1941.

“A workman’s mess hall was set up but native workers did not like the wholesome Detroit-style cooking and complained bitterly of indigestion. North American fare in the jungle no more pleases the customers than a quick change to Amazon fare would please you or me,” Wilson wrote in a Harpers magazine article titled “Mr. Ford in the Jungle.” Furthermore, the natives did not choose to square dance on the village green or to sing the quaint folk songs of Merrie England or to treasure Longfellow.”

Former Kalamazoo sheriff Curtis Pringle, a manager at Belterra, boosted labor relations when he eased off the Dearborn-style routine and deferred to local customs, especially when it came to meals and entertainment. Under Pringle, Belterra buildings did not contain the glass that made the powerhouse at Fordlandia unbearably hot, and weekend square dancing was optional. Alexander said Henry Ford balked at building a Catholic church at Fordlandia—even though Catholicism was the predominant Christian religion in Brazil. The Catholic chapel was erected right away at Belterra.

I peeked in the screen door of a building near the church, which still is assigned a parish priest, and found white wicker chairs lined against a sky blue wall in what looked like a reception room. “That’s the hospital.”

Alexander said of the long-closed but impeccably maintained facility that once boasted separate wards for men and women, thirty nurses, a dentist, three physicians and a pharmacist, who also administered anesthesia during surgery. “We were the Mayo Clinic of the Amazon,” said Szilagyi, recalling the facility that gained so much popularity that wealthy people off the plantation showed up for treatment.

The Belterra hospital, serving a population of seven thousand at its peak, was the medical center for the Brazilian Amazon and lured South American doctors who served internships under the tutelage of physicians from Detroit’s Henry Ford Hospital. Machete wounds were sewn, pneumonia was treated, babies were delivered and intestinal parasites were battled at the eighty-bed facility. Doctors received the latest medical journals from a horseback rider who daily trotted from Belterra to Santarem to meet the mail boat.

Medical service or not, death was common. “The average life expectancy of someone born in the Amazon was forty-five years old,” said Szilagyi. “They had just about every disease that we did here, except for the diseases of old age.”

In keeping with Ford’s cradle-to-grave philosophy on worker treatment, some of the cargo barges transported coffins from the United States and funerals were paid for by the company. I spied an abandoned coffin in Belterra sitting forgotten on a wooden shelf in the yard outside a workshop. Weathered wooden crosses, many askew or fallen, dotted the overgrown field that marked the cemetery.

There was never a rubber harvest at Fordlandia. In 1942 Belterra—where chemicals were used against leaf blight—produced 750 tons of latex from disease-resistant Asian tree grafts, but that fell far below the 38,000-ton annual yield the automaker had wanted for its $7 million Rouge tire plant. There was also cultivation of eucalyptus, teak, balsa and other exotic woods among the 3.6 million trees on the Belterra concession. Some wood made its way into Ford Lincolns, for trim, but wholesale lumbering was marred by the hardness of trees that broke blades at the sawmill and Brazil’s ban on most wood exports. Belterra’s cinnamon, ginger, coffee, tea and cacao crops never produced significant income.

During World War II, Szilagyi recalled, work began on a military landing strip at Belterra because of concern that Nazis were eyeing South America. The U.S. government wanted bases in the region, particularly if there were attempts to sabotage the Panama Canal. An airstrip at the Ford concession was expected to discourage German interest in Brazil, which, although nonaligned, had a large and active Fascist party. In the months before the construction, plantation-bound ships were hindered by German subs plying the Brazilian coast. The concession depended upon hydroplane shipments from Belem and the plantation’s six-month food surplus. “In 1943, we cleared an area and preparations were made to establish an airfield,” said Szilagyi. The airfield plan was abandoned when Brazil joined the Allies. A few years later Belterra and Fordlandia, too, would be abandoned.

The initial years at Fordlandia were marked by labor problems, cost overruns and a troubling turnover of North American managers; the plantation manager changed hands four times from 1928 to 1930. Some researchers claim the rubber plantation failed because it was guided by factory-trained supervisors instead of horticulturists. Planting Fordlandia and Belterra trees in orderly rows, rather than in clumps, as they grew in the wild, left the trees vulnerable to mites and robbed them of protection from the hard rains and baking sun.

In his journal, botanist LaRue wrote that Ford was irked by $125,000 in bribes paid during negotiations for the concession. But the bribes were all that Brazilian officials received, because the plantations never turned a profit. In December 1945, a financially ailing Ford cited competition from synthetic rubber in announcing it would sell the concession back to Brazil for a token $250,000.

“Our war experience has taught us that synthetic rubber is superior to natural rubber for certain of our products,” declared a Ford press release. The statement described the rubber plantations as a $20 million investment, but some historians say the company may have pumped in as much as $30 million before abandoning the project.

Today, the discarded plantations present a thorny problem. Their remote locations deep in the jungle render them hard to utilize, yet their solidly built structures, workshops, roads and electrical lines leave them shameful to abandon. The clusters of workshops and homes, far from cities and public services, now tenaciously cling to existence.

“It’s a white elephant for the government,” said Alexander, explaining that the federal government assumed the Companhia Industrial do Brasil payroll and even today pays a team of workers to maintain the buildings while it tries to convince the municipality to take over the complex. “But the municipality doesn’t want the responsibility of the payroll.”

Rubber groves at both complexes fall under the authority of Brazil’s Ministry of Agriculture, but the trees no longer are tapped. A research station for experimental plantings, including the grafting of oranges, is based at Belterra and there is talk of moving the government’s wood-technology center from Santarem to Belterra or starting an agricultural school on the abandoned concession. Although technically the villages are closed to outsiders, squatters at Belterra recently have thrown up thatch huts with mud-daubed walls near the older, sturdier Michigan-inspired buildings.

At Belterra, a building used to coagulate rubber to reduce its bulk operates as a surgical-glove factory. In response to the alarming AIDS rate in the South American country, negotiations are under way to expand the factory to produce condoms. Ironically, none of the rubber is from the area. “It comes from a plantation upriver,” a factory worker noted. “We make forty-four thousand pairs of gloves a month with about twenty-two workers on two shifts,” he observed.

“Fordlandia is the most problematic of the facilities,” Alexander concluded, noting that the facility is only accessible via a twelve-hour boat ride from Santarem. “But Belterra, perhaps, can be rescued and resuscitated.”

Szilagyi once agreed with Alexander but now wonders if it is too late for the plantation village he called home for nearly three years. He regrets that a 1945 meeting to discuss the future of the concession—a Detroit lunch meeting at which Henry Ford II was expected to question the doctor about Fordlandia and Belterra—was postponed and never rescheduled.

“I would have told him that Fordlandia should be abandoned. It was a very picturesque place and would have been a wonderful hideaway for Ford executives—like a little Switzerland for fishing and hunting—but it was not appropriate for a plantation,” Szilagyi said. “For Belterra, if I had had a chance, I would have told him to keep going. “They shouldn’t have given it up.”

Mary Dempsy is a Detroit-based freelace writer who frequently travels on assignment to South America. Her work appears in the Los Angeles Times, the (Toronto) Globe and Mail, Travel & Leisure and New Scientist magazine. 

This article first appeared in the July/August 1994 issue of Michigan History.

Due to the large size of photos, click description below to view:

Michigan-made fire hydrand in Belterra.

Belterra's white clapboard homes

Machete-wielding Brazilians were hired to tap the tens of thousands of rubber trees planted at Fordlandia.

The sawmill was transported from Michigan in pieces, then reassembled in the Brazilian Amazon.

Belterra's broken sidewalks and aging buildings are some of the remaining vestiges from one of Henry Ford's more exotic experiements.

Hand molds used to make latex gloves hang inside Balterra's former rubber-coagulating plant.

Historic photos The Henry Ford

Color photos Mary A. Dempsey

 

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